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Price-fixing Class Actions: A Canadian
Perspective
By Charles M. Wright & Matthew D. Baer*

I. Introduction
Prior to the enactment of class proceedings legislation in
Canada, there were virtually no price-fixing cases commenced. Prior
to 1993, when Ontario's Class Proceedings Act' was proclaimed into
force, the complexity and expense associated with pursuing pricefixing litigation had rendered the justice system in Canada largely
inaccessible to all but a few select persons harmed by the
conspiracies. Without specific class proceedings legislation, it is the
authors' belief that Canadians would, like others around the world,
have to rely on the U.S. courts to attempt to obtain recourse.
Fortunately, Canadian courts have demonstrated that they have the
ability to effectively provide justice for their citizens. In Canada,
class proceedings provide those victimized by price-fixing
conspiracies access to justice in an efficient manner. And, in 1999,
on
the Siskinds firm 2 filed the first of many class actions that focused
3
price-fixing cartels and the harm they caused to Canadians.
Recent attempts to have the rights of international claimants
adjudicated in U.S. courts have the potential to provide an alternative
and likely beneficial route for Canadians. Given Canada's unique
situation, however, parallel proceedings with increased cooperation
may be more appropriate. In the meantime, defendants seeking to
* Charles M. Wright is a partner and Matthew D. Baer is an associate at
Siskind, Cromarty, Ivey & Dowler, L.L.P. in London, Ontario. They practice

exclusively in the area of class actions. Mr. Wright is also the co-author of CLASS
ACTIONS LAW AND PRACTICE (Butterworths ed., 1999).
1 Class Proceedings Act, S.O., ch. 6 (1992) (Ont.).

Siskinds is a full-service law firm with its head office in London, Ontario.
The firm's class action department handles competition, products liability, and
2

consumer cases for both plaintiffs and defendants.
3 Ford v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., et al., [2000] O.J. No. 1355 (S.C.J.).
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resolve litigation and obtain an effective release should ensure that a
Canadian court has blessed the settlement.
This article looks at the legal background of price-fixing class
actions in Canada, the Siskinds firm's approach to class definition,
the inclusion of Canadian class members in U.S. class actions, and
the interaction between Canadian and U.S. class action proceedings.

II. Legal Background
The Competition Act 4 governs all aspects of competition law
in Canada. Section 36 of the Act gives private parties the right to
recover in courts any losses or damages suffered as a result of a
breach of the criminal provisions of the Act:
36. (1) Any person who has suffered loss or damage as a
result of
(a) conduct that is contrary to any provision of
Part VI, or
(b) the failure of any person to comply with an
order of the Tribunal or another court under this
Act, may, in any court of competent jurisdiction,
sue for and recover from the person who engaged
in the conduct or failed to comply with the order
an amount equal to the loss or damage proved to
have been suffered by him, together with any
additional amount that the court may allow not
exceeding the full cost to him of any investigation
in connection with the matter and of proceedings
under this section.5
A conspiracy to enhance unreasonably the price of a product ("pricefixing") is one of the criminal provisions listed under Part VI of the
Competition Act:
45. (1) Every one who conspires, combines, agrees or
arranges with another person

4

Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-34 (1985) (Can.).

' R.S.C., ch. C-34. § 36.
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(a) to limit unduly the facilities for transporting,
producing, manufacturing, supplying, storing or
dealing in any product,
(b) to prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the
manufacture or production of a product or to
enhance unreasonably the price thereof,
(c) to prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in the
production, manufacture, purchase, barter, sale,
storage, rental, transportation, or supply of a
product, or in the price of insurance on persons or
property, or
(d) to otherwise restrain or injure competition
unduly, is guilty of an indictable offence and
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
five years or to a fine not exceeding ten millions
dollars or to both.6
Under Canadian law, there is no authority for the court to award
treble damages. A defendant's ultimate exposure, however, is not
significantly lessened given the presence of:
(a) The English style costs regime (which is further
enhanced by Section 36, above),7
(b) The entitlement to pre-judgment interest at a
commercial rate from the date when the damage first
began, 8 and
(c) The potential for punitive damages. 9
Where a defendant has paid a fine for a Section 45 offence, punitive
damages may be difficult to obtain; but, in the absence of such
proceedings, a class action for price-fixing would seem ideal for a
6

R.S.C., ch. C-34. § 45.

7 Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O., Reg. 194 (1990) (Ont.).
8 Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O., ch. C.43, § 128 (1990) (Ont.).
9 Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130.
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large punitive damage award.' 0
The Competition Act references the recovery of damages and
does not incorporate any guidelines that would limit recovery to
direct purchasers or exclude intermediaries or consumers from
recovery. Compensation, rather than deterrence (or perhaps both, but
not the latter at the expense of the former) seems to have been the
purpose of the legislation. On March 14, 1974, Herb Gray, then
Canadian Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, made the
following comments in legislative debate about the proposed
legislation:
This bill reflects that all Canadians can benefit from having
a marketplace subject to the stimulus and the pressures of
the forces of competition. However, it places particular
emphasis on measures to assist them as consumers and also
as small businessmen.
The Minister continued on and stated:
Equally new is the proposal that anyone injured by a
violation of the act would be able to sue for full damages
and costs. As I have said previously, I believe that to be
meaningful this right should be exercisable not only by an
individual citizen or government but also by citizens
through class or representative actions.
It is my hope that the bill in the form in which it is finally
approved by parliament will enable class actions to take
place for damages caused by violations of it, in so far as the
federal parliament has the authority to make such a
decision. 1
Indeed, in Chadha v. Bayer,'2 the Ontario Court (General Division)
rejected a motion for summary judgment that sought to apply the
U.S. Supreme Court authorities in Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe
Machinery'3 and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.14 These U.S. decisions
10Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595.
11 1974 Legislative Session: 4th Session, 30th Parliament.
12 Chadha v. Bayer, Inc., [1999] 45 O.R.3d 29, O.J. No. 3773 (Gen. Div.),
cert. granted, [2001] 54 O.R.3d 520, 549, O.J. No. 1844 (Div. Ct.), cert. denied,
appeal dismissed, [2003] 63 O.R.3d 22, O.J. No. 27 (C.A.).
13 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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stand for the proposition that only direct purchasers, and not
intermediaries or consumers, are able to recover damages as a result
of price-fixing conspiracies. 15 This limitation can create a windfall
for direct purchasers who are able to pass on an overcharge in whole
or in part to an indirect purchaser, yet would be entitled to recover the
entire amount of the "damages," and potentially three times that
amount.' 6 On the other hand, an indirect purchaser, who may have
suffered the true loss, is barred from any recovery. Justice Sharpe of
the Ontario Court (Gen. Div.) stated:
[W]hile the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States deserve serious consideration by this court, they are
plainly not binding. Moreover, it appears that the two
decisions relied on are based significantly upon policy
considerations relating to the enforcement of American
antitrust laws. Those policies may well differ from the
values underlying Canadian competition law. One needs to
look no further than the treble damage remedy that played a
significant role in the Supreme Court decisions referred to
above. 17

Although the Competition Act has made available a private
remedy for price-fixing conspiracies in Canada since 1976, it was the
advent of the Class Proceedings Act 18 that made pursuing a pricefixing remedy feasible. Section 5 of the Class Proceedings Act
provides that an action shall be certified if:
(a) the pleadings or the notice of application discloses a
cause of action;
(b) there is an identifiable class of two or more persons that
would be represented by the representative plaintiff or
defendant;
(c) the claims or defences of the class members raise

14

Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).

15 Chadha
16

v. Bayer, Inc., [1999] 45 O.R.3d 29 (Gen. Div.).
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).

17

Chadha,45 O.R.3d at 29.

18

Class Proceedings Act, S.O., ch. 6 (1992) (Ont.).
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common issues;
(d) a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure
for the resolution of the common issues; and
(e) there is a representative plaintiff or defendant who,
(i) would fairly and adequately represent the interests of
the class,
(ii) has produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out
a workable method of advancing the proceeding on
behalf of the class and of notifying class members of the
proceeding, and
(iii) does not have, on the common issues for the class,
an interest in conflict with the interests of other class
members. 19
Note that, in contrast to actions brought in the United States,
no predomination test is incorporated in the test for certification in
Canada. In this respect, Canadian courts may be somewhat more
inclined to certify classes. The class proceedings legislation has been
interpreted with the intent of carrying out the three principle
objectives of class proceedings in Canada: access to justice, judicial
economy, and behavior modification.20

Il. The Siskinds Firm's Approach To Class Definition
The Siskinds firm has been retained by plaintiffs at various
levels in the stream of commerce to commence proceedings. These
actions have been brought on behalf of all levels of purchasers, both
direct purchasers and subsequent "downstream" purchasers. This
approach ensures complete disgorgement by taking from the
defendant its primary weapon, the pass-on defense. This firm also
takes the view that in Canada, as a result of this system, damages are
more often paid to those plaintiffs who have actually suffered harm
than under the U.S. system. From a policy perspective, defendants
" S.O., ch. 6, § 5.
Bendall v. McGhan Med. Corp., 1993 Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 1348.

20
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facing proceedings can at least take solace in the fact that they will
not face multiple actions from different levels of purchasers.
The litigation under the Siskinds firm's approach allows the
action to proceed in two separate steps. The first step consists of
establishing liability and determining aggregate damages. All class
members, regardless of what level of purchaser, have a common
interest in establishing liability and maximizing aggregate damages.
The second step involves the distribution of damages amongst the
purchasers based on the class of purchaser. The Ontario Superior
Court of Justice has endorsed this approach to price-fixing class
actions. In Vitapharm v. F. Hoffinann-LaRoche Ltd., Justice
Cumming stated:
It is not difficult to understand why a global assessment is
necessary in the case at hand. The starting point to any
quantification of damages must be to determine the
difference between the economic rents generated due to the
alleged conspiracy, and what the normative economic rents
would have been had a competitive market prevailed.

It seems probable that due to varying economic factors
persons at different levels in the overall distribution process
suffered different losses. There may well be different
interests and perspectives as between different users.
Claimants at any given level of user in the distribution
chain, such as retail purchasers, may well require separate
counsel at that point in time to properly represent their
interests. Separate subclasses can be formed if appropriate:
see ss. 8(2), (3), 1 l(1)(b), 12, 25 and 26 of the CPA.

In the United States the courts in some circumstances
involving private treble-damage actions under the federal
anti-trust legislation (the Sherman Act) have denied
recovery to end users. See the majority decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) per White J. (Brennan and
Blackmun JJ. dissenting). In my view, this and like
authority is not relevant to the case at hand. Section 36 of
the Competition Act says that "any person who has suffered
loss or damage" may bring an action, including it would
seem, retail purchasers.
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Until the point of a determination of the common issues,
including the assessment of global damages on a product
by product basis, there is no divergence of interests
between class members. The contrary seems true. Through
the common pursuit of the common issues, all class
members are more likely to maximize the quantification of
their overall, global damages and achieve their ultimate,
shared goal of a2 1fair and just resolution of the claims of all
class members.
The authority for assessing damages in the aggregate and paying
monies out on a cy pros basis are outlined in the Class Proceedings
Act.22 Section 24 of the Class Proceedings Act gives directions to the
courts on using aggregate assessments of monetary relief:
24. (1) The court may determine the aggregate or a part of a
defendant's liability to class members and give judgment
accordingly where,
(a) monetary relief is claimed on behalf of some or
all class members;
(b) no questions of fact or law other than those
relating to the assessment of monetary relief remain
to be determined in order to establish the amount of
the defendant's monetary liability; and
(c) the aggregate or a part of the defendant's
liability to some or all class members can
reasonably be determined without proof by
individual class members.
(2) The court may order that all or a part of an award under
subsection (1) be applied so that some or all individual
class members share in the award on an average or
proportional basis.
21

Vitapharm Canada Ltd. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd., [2000] O.T.C. 877

(S.C.J.).
22

S.O., ch. 6.

2004]

A CanadianPerspective to Price-fixing

(3) In deciding whether to make an order under subsection
(2), the court shall consider whether it would be impractical
or inefficient to identify the class members entitled to share
in the award or to determine the exact shares that should be
allocated to individual class members.23
The Siskinds firm has resolved six cases since 2000 for classes
composed in the manner described above. 24 Typically, the settlements
are approved in Ontario and Quebec (Canada's two most populous
provinces) at a minimum, with a national class being certified in the
Ontario courts.
Although it is beneficial to have intermediary purchasers and
consumers represented in the action to ensure that the ill-gotten
profits derived from wrongdoing are disgorged, there are significant
practical problems in identifying these class members and
appropriately distributing proceeds. Depending on the type of pricefixing conspiracy, intermediate purchasers and consumers could
number in the millions and their respective share of the settlement
proceeds on an individual basis could be nominal. The solution to this
problem has been to distribute the proceeds allocated to these groups,
which is determined using expert economic models, by way of a cy
pros distribution. Such a distribution allows the proceeds to be used
for the indirect benefit of class members, through payments to
relevant organizations or groups, where distribution to individual
class members would be impracticable.
Section 26 of the Class Proceedings Act governs the
distribution of a judgment and specifically authorizes a cy pros
distribution:
26. (1) The court may direct any means of distribution of
amounts awarded under section 24 or 25 that it considers
appropriate.

23

S.O., ch. 6, § 24.

24

See Alfresh Beverages Can. Corp. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., et al.,

[2001] O.J. No. 6028 (Citric Acid); Alfresh Beverages Can. Corp. v. Hoechst AG,
[2002] O.J. No. 79 & Alfresh Beverages Can. Corp. v. Chisso Corp., Order of
Cumming J. (4 November, 2003) (unreported) (Sorbates); Bona Foods, Ltd. v.
Pfizer Inc., [2002] O.J. No. 5553 (Sodium Erythorbate); Minnema v. Archer
Daniels Midland, et al., Order of McKinnon J. (28 February, 2003) (unreported)
(lysine); Newly Weds Foods Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., Endorsement of Winkler J. (7
April, 2003) (unreported) (Maltol); and A&M Sod Supply, Ltd. v. Akzo Nobel
Chemicals B.V., et al., Order of Nordheimer J. (22 December, 2003) (unreported)
(MCAA).
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(4) The court may order that all or a part of an award under
section 24 that has not been distributed within a time set by
the court be applied in any manner that may reasonably be
expected to benefit class members, even though the order
does not provide for monetary relief to individual class
members, if the court is satisfied that a reasonable number
of class members who would not otherwise receive
monetary relief would benefit from the order.
(5) The court may make an order under subsection (4)
whether or not all class members can be identified or all of
their shares can be exactly determined.
(6) The court may make an order under subsection (4) even
if the order would benefit,
(a) persons who are not class members; or
(b) persons who may otherwise receive monetary relief
as a result of the class proceeding. 25
In Alfresh Beverages Canada Corp. v. Hoechst AG et al.,26 Justice
Cumming reviewed the manner in which the settlement fund would
be paid out and endorsed a cy pros distribution:
The plaintiff commenced this proceeding March 28, 2000,
alleging that the defendants conspired to fix the prices and
allocate the market share of sorbates between 1979 and
1996. Sorbates (including potassium sorbate and sorbic
acid) are chemical preservatives used primarily as a mould
inhibitor in high moisture and sugar foods such as, for
example dairy and bakery products.

The distribution protocol provides for the distribution of
monies as between four different categories of class

S.O., ch. 6, § 26.
26

Alfresh Beverages Can. Corp. v. Hoechst AG, [2002] O.J. No. 79 (S.C.J.).
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members. Class members include "distributors", being
those who purchased and resold sorbates to a further
purchaser; "manufacturers", who purchased sorbates and
manufactured a product of which the sorbates was a
component part; "intermediaries", who purchased products
which contain sorbates as a component part, and resold the
same or virtually the same product to a further purchaser;
and "consumers" who purchased products which contain
sorbates as a component part, and consumed the product.

A Distributors and Manufacturers Settlement Fund is
established for entities across Canada who purchased
sorbates in raw form. The payments from this fund will be
made pro rata to all entities who file timely claims based
upon verified purchases.

There are significant problems in identifying possible
claimants below the manufacturer level. Hence, the monies
allocated to intermediaries such as wholesalers and
consumers are to be paid by a cy prs distribution to
specified not-for-profit entities, in effect as surrogates for
these categories of claimants, for the general, indirect
benefit of such class members. The CPA _provides the
flexibility for this approach: see ss 24 and 26.2

IV. Inclusion of Canadian Class Members in U.S. Class
Actions
There has been a recent trend in the United States to attempt
to include class members who reside outside the United States,
including Canadians, in class definitions. In a class action filed
against two auction houses, Christie's International PLC and
Sotheby's Holdings, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
participated in illegal and secretive meetings and entered into a
conspiracy to unlawfully fix seller's and buyer's premiums. 2' The
27

id.

Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002), cert.
dismissed, 124 S. Ct. 27 (2003).
28
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plaintiffs had all either sold or purchased goods in auctions occurring
outside of the United States and claimed that they paid inflated
commissions as a result of the conspiracy between the two auction
houses.29
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that, even though the conspiracy to fix prices was in a foreign
market, the defendants could not escape scrutiny under U.S. antitrust
law if the plaintiffs could show the conspiracy had an effect on U.S.
commerce. 30 The class action was resolved before the U.S. Supreme
Court determined whether it would grant certiorari. This same
jurisdictional issue, however, is currently being raised in Empagran
S.A., et al. v. F. Hoffinan-LaRoche, Ltd., et al., 31 and will be
pronounced upon by the U.S. Supreme Court in that case.
During the auction houses litigation, a claim had also been
commenced in Ontario. As part of the resolution of the U.S. case,
Canadian plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their case. The Ontario court
was presented with evidence concerning the fairness of the
settlement. Only then did the Ontario court approve the dismissal.
There is developing jurisprudence suggesting that defendants
who negotiate the settlement of Canadian claims with U.S. counsel,
and seek to bar future Canadian claims through U.S. court orders do
so at their own peril. In some earlier litigation that addressed this
issue, Canadian counsel intervened in U.S. courts where Canadian
women were apportioned unequal benefits under breast implant
settlements. 32 Due to some changes to those settlements, Canadian
courts did not have to consider what impact, if any, the orders issued
in U.S. courts had on pending Canadian class actions.
However, Canadian courts did become involved in the Dalkon
Shield litigation. 33 Quebec women sought relief after the deadline for
making claims had passed in the United States. The Canadian court
found the notice given to Quebec residents to be inadequate, and
29
30

Id.
Id.

31 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir.
2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 966 (Dec. 15, 2003) (No. 03-724).
32 In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liab. Litig., No. 926 (J.P.M.L.);
Lindsey v. Coming Corp,, No. CV 94-P-i 1558-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521
(N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994). See also In re Dow Coming Corp., 194 B.R. 121 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1996).
33 Tremaine v. A.H. Robins Can., Inc., [1990] 23 A.C.W.S.J. 1026 (C.A.
Que.).
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ultimately, the parties entered into a separate class action settlement.
Also, most recently, in Parsons v. McDonald's,34 an Ontario court
allowed a class action to proceed on the basis that the U.S. settlement
did not bar Canadian claims. The court held that the U.S. court
decision was not binding on the Canadian court because it offended
natural justice.
Defendants seeking closure in Canada are well advised to
obtain court approval in Canada, either in the manner pursued in the
auction houses litigation, or by getting full-fledged approvals
regarding notice and fairness from the Canadian courts. This
approach is currently being employed in a class action involving
defective Entran II tubin% used as a conduit for fluid for radiant
heating or snow melting. In the Entran II case, one settlement,
which treats U.S. and Canadian class members equally, is in the
process of being approved in both countries. Obtaining approval by
the courts in both countries is necessary to ensure a truly effective
release. These settlement approvals avoid the expense of multiple
negotiations and settlement agreements as well as the uncertainty of
whether a Canadian plaintiff who did not opt out of a U.S.
proceeding, would be bound by the result of that proceeding in
Canada.
Other jurisdictions around the world, such as that of the
European Union, have also made strides in developing 36
a multijurisdictional approach to address private antitrust actions. While
inclusion in an international class might benefit plaintiffs in
jurisdictions where there is no viable tort system, to ignore Canada or
any other jurisdiction that has a viable class proceedings regime in
place and attempt to settle on a world-wide basis in the United States
is a dangerous proposition for defendants.

V.

Interaction Between Canadian and U.S. Class
Action Proceedings

Increasingly, parallel antitrust class actions are being
commenced in the United States and Canada. Although obvious

34
35

Parsons v. McDonald's Rest. of Can. Ltd., [2004] O.J. No. 83 (S.C.J.).
Galanti v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 03-CV-00209 (D.N.J.) (order

granting motion for preliminary approval of settlement entered Oct. 14, 2003);
Kelman v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Ont. S.C.J.) (unreported).
36 Jonathan Sinclair, Damages in PrivateAntitrust Actions in Europe, 14 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REv. 547, 548 (2002).
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efficiencies can be realized where counsel in multiple jurisdictions
share information and coordinate activities, defendants in these
proceedings tend to erect barriers to ensure plaintiffs cannot share
information. Even though, as a general rule, discovery in the United
States takes place in the public domain, it appears to have become
standard procedure of defendants to get courts in the United States to
issue protective orders to restrict public access to the documents that
are produced, which in turn restricts access to plaintiffs in Canada.
In Vitapharm v. F. Hoffinann-LaRoche Ltd.,3 7 where the

plaintiffs allege a world-wide price-fixing conspiracy in the market
for certain vitamins, the Canadian plaintiffs moved before the United
States Court for the District of Maryland, under U.S. rules, in an
attempt to intervene in the litigation and gain access to evidence that
was under a protective order. Immediately thereafter, the defendants
brought a motion in the Canadian courts, seeking to prevent the
plaintiffs from pursuing the U.S. orders. Justice Hogan, the presiding
judge in the U.S. litigation, granted the Canadian plaintiffs' motion to
intervene in the U.S. proceedings. However, he deferred his decision
to modify the protective order pending the conclusion of the
defendants' motion in Canada to stop ° the plaintiffs from proceeding
with the motion in the United States.
In the Canadian motion, the judge of first instance, Justice
Cumming, ruled that the plaintiffs were merely seeking access to
discovery and not discovery itself, and ruled the U.S. motion could
proceed. Justice Cumming went on to state that:
As a result of the inexorable forces of globalization and
expanding international free trade and open markets, there
will be an ever-increasing inter-jurisdictional presence of
corporate enterprises. This is seen particularly in respect of
American and Canadian business activity, given the extent
of cross-border trade. If both societies are to maximize the
benefits of expanding free trade and open markets, the legal
systems of both countries must recognize and facilitate an
expeditious, fair and efficient regime for the resolution of
litigation that arises from disputes in either one or both
countries.
re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1285, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25068, *18 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2004) (Memorandum Opinion re: Canadian Plaintiffs'
Motion to Intervene).
38 Vitapharm Can. Ltd. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., [2001] 11 C.P.R.4th
(S.C.J.).
37 In
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The Plaintiffs are not seeking discovery in the U.S. through
their U.S. Motion. Rather, they are only seeking access to
the discovery of the litigants in the U.S. Litigation. From a
legal standpoint, the U.S. Motion is only necessary because
of the Protective Order.
If there was no Protective Order and the plaintiffs were
simply given access to discovery documents and
the U.S. Litigation, the defendants
depositions generated in 39
could not take objection.
On appeal, the Ontario Divisional Court affirmed that the
Canadian plaintiffs were attempting to secure access to the fruits of
discovery conducted by the parties in the U.S. litigation that might be
of probative value in the Canadian action. They were not seeking the
right to examine any nerson or compel production of any documents
in the United States.4p The Ontario Court of Appeal also upheld the
decision, properly characterizing the situation as the plaintiffs merely
attempting to gather evidence in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance
with the rules of that jurisdiction.41 If there were no protective order,
the evidence would be freely available to plaintiffs and defendants
would have no ground to object. Leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada was denied on November 27, 2003.42
It is our hope that the decisions regarding procedure, such as
those in the vitamins litigation, can assist in increasing coordination
amongst plaintiffs' counsel in Canada and the United States, and
potentially beyond. Plaintiffs in these price-fixing cases have the
challenge of litigating against large, well-financed corporations. For
this reason, which is a major reason class actions exist in the first
place, reasonable sharing amongst plaintiffs should be allowed.

39 Vitapharm Can. Ltd. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., [2000] O.T.C. 877

(S.C.J.).
40 Vitapharm Can. Ltd. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., [2002] O.J. No. 1400
(Div. Ct.).
41 Vitapharm Can. Ltd. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., [2003] O.J. No. 868
(C.A.).
42 The U.S. motion deferred by Justice Hogan was never decided.

478

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 16: 4

VI. Conclusion
Although the law in many respects is still evolving, Canada
has developed into a jurisdiction with a viable method for resolving
price-fixing class actions. Cooperation among class counsel from
different jurisdictions is and will become even more necessary in the
future. Otherwise, attempting to settle price-fixing class proceedings
on a world-wide basis will continue to be a dangerous proposition
that may not result in true finality. As many price-fixing conspiracies
extend across international borders, it is imperative to have a proper
understanding of the different regimes to best ensure a proper
resolution for both plaintiffs and defendants.

